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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Nuclear Power Industry Executives Advisory Panel provides channels of
communication between the Organization and Management Study Group of the MIT
International Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety and top managers actively
concerned with important strategic and operational issues relevant to safety. The Panel is
conceived as an opportunity for utilities to share their knowledge and concerns about aspects
of management and organization, both within plants and in the institutional context of the
national and international nuclear power industry. Further, the Panel seeks to identify
opportunities for collaborative research with practical benefits.
At the first Panel meeting, 16 representatives from nuclear power plants and utilities
in four countries and 11 MIT faculty, research staff, and students explored mutual interests
and priorities in order to guide future research efforts. Roundtable groups selected four
topics for discussion: compliance and autonomy; cost control and safety; plant aging and
workforce changes; and cross-functional complexity. Edward A. Brown, former CEO of New
Hampshire Yankee, provided an insider's perspective on the Seabrook construction project.
The MIT researchers discussed their proposed research design featuring three
interrelated studies conducted in utilities that operate multiple plants, one at each utility a
self-identified good performer, and a second needing improvement. Dr. Constance Perin
discussed a study of how outage planning and implementation utilizes organizational
pathways "off the organizational chart" that bridge across functions, levels, and technical
groups; Professor Alfred Marcus proposed case studies of performance improvement as a
problem-solving process in which plants draw upon an inventory of organizational solutions
that affect problem symptoms and core activities; Professor John Carroll focused on ways to
characterize the organizational knowledge distributed among various professional groups in
the plant, and its relationship to performance enhancement. In addition, Professor Donald
Schon discussed possible modes of collaborative research in which the Study Group
participates in plant enhancement programs. Such research could satisfy both scientific and
operating goals, and build bridges between academic and practitioner approaches.
The wide-ranging discussion explored topics of mutual interest, including a variety of
research opportunities and resource constraints. The Panel expressed a desire to be more
directly involved in the Study Group research by having more detail about theories, more
access to data, and opportunities to contribute interpretations of research observations. The
Study Group will work toward appropriate "case-like" materials. There was considerable
support for more intensive collaborative modes of research, and recognition of the
considerable resource commitment they entail. The Panel suggested efforts to examine the
organization and management of the regulators and their impact on plant performance. Next
steps were detailed for continued communication between the Panel and the MIT Study
Group.
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Background
The Organization and Management Study Group is conducting a
long-term research project whose goal is to develop conceptual
frameworks relevant to the management and organization of nuclear
power plants, and self-design tools that can help plants meet
demands to balance safety, efficient production of electricity,
and profitability. This project is part of the MIT International
Program for Enhanced Nuclear Power Plant Safety, which also
includes research on the science and technology of maintenance
and the role of public policy. Unlike other programs concerned
with safe performance, the Safety Program's interests are in
research, education, and technology transfer. Funded by private
utilities and foundations, we are in contact with but receive no
financial support from industry groups or government agencies
such as INPO, NRC, DOE, and IAEA. Current Program sponsors are
listed in Attachment 1.
The Nuclear Power Industry Executives Advisory Panel
consists of senior managers actively concerned with important
strategic and operational issues relevant to safety. The Panel
contributes advice and comments to the Study Group, sharing their
concerns and knowledge of plant operations and the national and
international nuclear power industry as a whole. The Panel is a
way for managers and researchers, collaboratively, to identify
important issues for research with practical benefits. Active
participation in particular research studies is one item on the
Panel's agenda. Finally, where utilities are initiating
organizational change, MIT may be able to offer support for
research based around these change and implementation efforts.
Executives in utilites sponsoring the Safety Program, as
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well as several others, were invited to the initial Panel meeting
at MIT on April 22-23, 1992. The meeting's objectives were:
- To discuss issues and concerns at the strategic level of the
nuclear power industry. For its first 18 months, the Study
Group research has been primarily at the plant level, but
now is considering as well the relationships to corporate
levels and to regulators, suppliers, contractors, industry
groups, and the labor market.
- To create additional channels of communication between the
Study Group and sponsors to orient and prioritize the
research and to contribute additional insights into our
observations and interpretations.
- To examine strategic choices among research options and
types of collaborative research, and the nature of near- and
long-term research products, including the kinds of new
knowledge that could be used to address important issues.
- To seek strategies for acquiring additional resources for
the Study Group and the Safety Program. The ambitious goals
of the Program and the opportunities for research made
available by utilities exceed available resources.
The preliminary agenda (see Attachment 2) was structured to
invite participants to raise and discuss their own issues and
concerns, and to enable the Study Group to present their research
strategies and plans for discussion. Included was an outline of
possibilities for collaborative research, and discussion of
specific next steps for the Study Group and the Advisory Panel.
Meetina Summary
The meeting began with introductions of 16 representatives
from 6 U.S. utilities, two U.S. contractors, and utilities in
Japan, France, and Korea, and 11 MIT faculty, research staff, and
students. Attachment 3 provides a list of the participants.
Professor John Carroll positioned the Study Group's research
within the nuclear power industry and the scientific study of
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high-hazard industries. The Study Group is not a regulator or
evaluator that assesses good and bad practices; nor is it a
consulting group paid to solve problems. Instead, its
distinctive contribution is to characterize the work of producing
electricity in nuclear plants in terms of conceptual frameworks
and self-design principles that can help those responsible for
safe operations to design their own tools for solving their
particular problems.
Nuclear power plants and other high-hazard technologies such
as chemical production plants, airlines, some military
operations, and bloodbanks pose greater management challenges for
high-reliability operations (avoidance of errors, quick recovery
from problems, and efficient learning from precursors and
incidents) than the typical manufacturing or service
organization. This places unusual pressure on training, employee
vigilance, monitoring and quality controls, information flows,
adequate resources, planning, and intergroup coordination.
The overall theoretical approach of the Study Group avoids
the common "machine bureaucracy" and "compliance" images of
nuclear power plants, which imply that there is one best way to
manage. Instead, our research suggests that plant activities are
better understood within a biological model (sometimes called
ecological or open-systems) that considers continual innovation
and change as essential properties of "living" organizations that
must interact in an environment of other organizations and
institutions. This image suggests that several organizational
dimensions are important: cross-functional and other cross-
boundary interdependencies; collective action; vigilance as a
response to uncertainty; continuous learning; long-term
investments in people and technology; and a recognition that
management must tailor its practices to varying situations. This
perspective further suggests that the effectiveness of "best
practices" is enhanced by a thorough understanding of how
practices taken from one plant can be tailored and modified for
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use in a new organizational context.
The research strategy of the Study Group is distinctive
because it reaches beyond a catalog of indicators with which to
compare plant performance and prescribe procedures. Further,
there is primary reliance on in-plant studies grounded in the
details of how the work gets done and in the observations and
interpretations of plant personnel throughout the organization
and its environment, from maintenance workers to managers, design
engineers, regulators, and suppliers. Although we have spent
from one to four weeks in 17 plants in 6 countries, we recognize
that intensive analyses of specific plants must be integrated
with statements about large numbers of plants. Accordingly,
Prof. Alfred Marcus from the University of Minnesota joined the
Study Group to help create synergies between analysis of large
quantitative data sets about plant safety and performance and
grounded approaches in specific plants.
One objective of the Panel Meeting was to hear top managers
express their own concerns and issues and to begin considering
how these could be introduced into the research project. The MIT
research team suggested 11 topics as possibilities for Roundtable
(break-out) discussions, and the participants added 13 more
topics of their own. Discussion of these possibilities reduced
and combined them into six high-priority issues. Four topics
were chosen for Roundtables: (a) compliance and autonomy; (b)
cost control and safety; (c) plant aging and workforce changes;
and (d) cross-functional and multi-site complexity. A fifth
topic, managing change, was considered to cross-cut all the
topics, and to be a part of each discussion. A sixth topic,
public attitudes, was set aside with slightly lesser priority and
less germane to the (current) research agenda. Reports from each
Roundtable were later presented to the meeting as a whole. Ed
Brown, former CEO of New Hampshire Yankee, enriched the
discussion of utility concerns by providing an insider's
perspective on the history of the Seabrook construction project.
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Another objective of the Panel meeting was to discuss and
provide strategic guidance regarding the research opportunities
available to the Study Group. Each of the three principal MIT
researchers in the Organization and Management Study Group
outlined their studies and the opportunities presented by the
project. In addition, Professor Donald Schon discussed how modes
of collaborative research in which the Study Group participates
in plant enhancement programs could satisfy both scientific and
operating goals and build bridges between academic and
practitioner approaches.
This report briefly summarizes the issues raised by Panel
participants during Roundtables, presents the research
possibilities and strategic issues from the MIT presentations,
organizes the very rich interaction and general discussion, and
closes with a summary of the possibilities raised by the
participants for continued Panel activity and support for
collaborative research.
Strategic Issues for the Nuclear Power Industry
Compliance and Autonomy
Regulators tend to conceptualize safety as compliance with
rules; INPO fosters an industry-wide culture of proceduralization
and compliance. These detailed codifications and programs to
ensure compliance have brought about great improvements in
safety. The continuing trend is toward more explicit procedures,
responding to both external and internal pressure to reduce
risks. During operations, there is a tendency to do what the
pieces of paper say, even if it is in conflict with what is
believed to be right. People do not get in trouble for following
the rules. When problems are encountered, the easiest solution
is to fix the procedure to avoid that problem next time, thus
making the procedures more and more explicit.
Blind adherence to procedure and compliance has the
potential to create attitudes that are contrary to safety and
performance in the long run. Heavy emphasis on proceduralization
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can suppress ideas and originality; autonomy can increase pride,
quality, and productivity. There is a desire in the nuclear
power industry, shared in U.S. business in general, to push
responsibility lower down into the organization and "empower"
workers. This is partly to invigorate and motivate employees and
foster thinking, but also acknowledges that procedures may never
be so prescriptive as to be complete -- sometimes, doing the
"proper" thing is not doing the "right" thing. Only a competent
and vigilant workforce can recognize the difference and
demonstrate "thoughtful" compliance. The Canandian operating
policy and principles were said to stress thoughtful compliance,
for example.
There was discussion of a role for the MIT Study Group to
seek an independent understanding of how regulators understand
standards and compliance; how employees feel about their jobs,
the reward and recognition systems, and their understanding of
why management does what it does; and international comparisons
that could provide alternative models of procedure management.
Cost Control and Safety
The nuclear power industry experiences contradictory
pressures to spend money and control costs. Regulators demand
expensive security, maintenance work rules, and record keeping,
for example; states impose costs for monitoring and
telecommunication equipment. Competitive pressures from
alternative power sources are substantial as nuclear operations
and maintenance costs have been rising more rapidly; Public
Utility Commissions only authorize investments if they can
realize a lower price for power than from other sources. Since
many costs are mandated, nuclear utilities are under pressure to
cut wherever they can, sometimes including preventive maintenance
and other fundamental activities.
There is a need to find a more rational budgeting process.
Great variation exists in how budgets are constructed, including
frequent turf battles and substantial subjectivity. Outages
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often produce surprises that exceed target-based budgets. One
bright spot is that new performance-based regulation at Pilgrim
seems to integrate safety and cost by attaching bonuses to
improved performance and safety indicators. Workers seem more
attentive to safety issues than they were before implementation
of these regulations.
Since TMI, investments in maintenance and technical fixes
have increased capacity, but results from new investments in
preventive maintenance and human resource issues are more
difficult to quantify. The risks of additional investments are
greater because aging plants may not get life extensions and may
experience reduced performance. The industry needs analysis of
the pressures to increase costs and the returns on investments.
Some pressures are political, such as New Hampshire's insistence
on real-time access to plant indicators, and Massachusetts'
insistence that Seabrook install a $6 million radio system.
The nuclear industries in Japan and France are under less
financial pressure. Electricity costs are higher, there are no
Public Utility Commissions, and borrowing limits are virtually
non-existent because the state backs all loans. In Japan, there
is pressure to reduce construction costs.
Plant Aging and Workforce Changes
Aging and the life-cycle of plants from construction to
decommissioning is a major factor in this industry. Hardware
undergoes changes with age; the embrittlement issue at Yankee
Rowe is one example. There is an expectation that the upward
progress of the industry must necessarily become increasingly
difficult, since the easier and less expensive improvements have
been done.
Since nuclear power industry workers rarely transfer to
other industries and there is essentially no new power plant
construction in the U.S., American workers are aging in their
jobs with little upward career mobility. This suggests the
possibility of boredom and demoralization. Aging workers may
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also experience physical limitations, such as restricted vision
and inability to handle stressful work, which places greater
demands on job assignment and scheduling to recognize variable
worker limitations. Workers in the nuclear power industry tend
to dislike change; it is possible that older workers will be more
resistant to change. Further, as workers retire, key knowledge
may be lost. Those who really understand why the procedures are
there get replaced by people who follow the procedures by rote.
Two other workforce problems were discussed. In Korea,
workers must work in rural areas near the plants, yet all
families want to live near Seoul so that the children can go to
the best schools, which lead to the best careers. The result is
family separation and considerable stress. In the U.S., new
entries are a much more culturally-diverse group of workers than
in the past, so that utilities have to manage the changing
demographics and increasing diversity. The lack of female and
minority top management in the nuclear power industry was noted.
There is a need to identify and evaluate human resource
programs that can alleviate the above problems. For example, job
redesign to enlarge responsibilities, creation of teams to do
more tasks, job rotation, autonomy and participation, can have
positive effects on worker motivation, substitute for upward
mobility, and reduce concentration of key knowledge in aging
workers. It was suggested that some existing programs may
provide novelty by putting a "new face" or new label on work, or
some job rotations may be a relief from routine rather than a
learning experience. One possibility would be to increase peer
visits within and between plants to share experience, learn from
each other, and energize workers at all ranks.
Cross-Functional and Multi-Site Complexity
Nuclear power plants have a functional organization and,
historically, the operations function was seen as most important.
Recently, other functions, notably maintenance, have been
recognized as important, as well as the management of cross-
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functional, interdisciplinary teams and coordination across
boundaries. The trend to decentralize staffs to plant levels is
shifting to consolidation, for example, Bell South Utility and
Southern.
The increased management involvement in maintenance is not
seen as a basic change. Rather, there is a felt need for more
management control, defined as better planning and preparation
and keeping everyone informed after work is done, such as changes
in the critical path of the work. The Swedish practice of block
tagging out whole systems reduces the chances of error, and is
being copied by some U.S. utilities.
Outage work is particularly complex. Seasoned teams at some
utilities make good prioritization decisions about work items,
others rely on predictive maintenance optimization programs. The
Eletricite de France maintenance book is an important reference.
Grand Gulf BWR in Mississippi had long outages, but last year
completed one in 30 days. How did they do it?
Different levels of the plant have different understandings
of the work. Managers should have technical knowledge, and many
trained in Navy nuclear programs have thorough knowledge of
operations, if they keep it up. Higher up in management, less
detail is needed. Managers must listen to problem reports, and
management systems that invite problem reporting are needed.
Information systems can decrease complexity, reveal
contradictions, and make information meaningful.
One problem area is procedure writing, which involves the
transition from design engineering to procedure writing. The
TVA, on completing its Belafonte station, has assembled a team
with different skills to deal with the handoff. Procedure
writing needs specialized startup engineers (roving consultants)
to develop procedures and involvement of operators.
Can we find better, innovative approaches to organizing work
from other industries, such as automobiles, manufacturing? The
trend to empowerment is against NRC regulations only where it
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changes the safety responsibilities.
Regulatory Demands
Another element relating to the above issues, the actions of
the NRC, surfaced in general discussion. Executives complain
that the NRC is not consistent across regions in rule-making,
fault-finding, and assigning penalties. NRC requirements shape
the organization in ways that may limit approaches to safety.
The NRC is perceived to be staffed with people who lack operating
experience, and there is little transfer of staff between
industry and regulators. Detailed analyses by management can
receive unthoughtful responses and, for practical purposes, there
are no grievance procedures or appeals from contested decisions.
Yankee Rowe was seen as a case study of this process with details
known only to insiders. It was suggested that the Study Group
turn its attention to NRC management and organization. The one
governmental agency that might share an interest in such a study
is the Congress (through the Office of Technology Assessment).
Ed Brown's presentation of the Seabrook construction project
also frames the "unfathomable maze" of the regulatory process.
In the 17 years from construction permit application to operating
license, two-thirds of the $6 billion cost was attributable to
licensing delays. He presented the strategic efforts to build
credibility with the public and the Seabrook employees, deal with
a wide range of constituencies with varied beliefs and demands,
and establish a track record of striving for perfection that has
ultimately led to a superior operating record. He concluded that
the total regulatory framework in the U.S. makes constructing a
plant in the U.S. too risky, unless and until credibility is
rebuild through safe, reliable operation; the spent fuel and
waste issue is resolved; the public is convinced that fossil
fuels are more harmful than nuclear; and the licensing process is
made shorter and more predictable.
Study Group Research Opportunities
Good vs. Troubled Pairs of Plants
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It is natural to attribute plant performance to qualities of
the people who staff and manage the plants. We have heard, for
example, that plants are a reflection of the senior nuclear
executives' level of involvement and personality. Workforces
have been characterized as high or low on "work ethic" and
general ability. Corporate culture is also mentioned.
However, we have observed interesting situations in which
the same utility runs multiple plants with different performance
histories. Sometimes, there is a "good performer" and a
"troubled plant" sharing the same physical site, as defined by
the utility itself (but also evident in performance histories).
A comparison of such pairs of plants would be especially
revealing because it focuses attention on the details of
organization and technology in each plant. The sites are also
interesting because various improvement strategies have been
tried at the troubled plants, offering opportunities to examine
change over time and implementation issues.
We have received invitations to conduct research at two such
pairs of plants at two different utilities. We plan on-site data
collection involving three interlocking studies carried out at
the same sites: Organizational Pathways, Mental Models, and
Improvement Strategies. Additionally, we are considering modes
of collaborative research that would involve the Study Group in
change efforts at these plants.
Organizational Pathways
Dr. Constance Perin discussed how the management of complex,
interdependent technological systems of nuclear power plants
demands that the activities of departments, divisions, and
functions are coordinated. Managers balance safety goals with
efficiency and production goals through a continuous exchange of
resources along organizational pathways. These include
production resources such as people, budgets, schedules,
materials, and tools, and organizational resources such as
mission, authority, information, experience, cooperation, and
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status.
Nuclear power plants are particularly complex because the
demands for coordination vary through the production and life
cycles of the plants, including construction, commissioning,
operating phases of power production and outage, and
decommissioning. "For years we thought that an outage was the
safest plant condition. Now we see that we do all the things
that really matter to risk assessment analyses during refueling.
We weren't smart enough to know that five years ago." Outage
planning and implementation are critical for both safety
enhancement and cost reduction, and require the highest degree of
cross-functional coordination.
Mapping organizational pathways in outage planning and
implementation will develop new knowledge about seven key issues:
1) learning from experience at all levels of the organization,
including the use of industry "best practices" and management
consultants' introduction of new organizational practices; 2)
managing transitions between operating phases and tempos,
including the potential for schedule pressure to create reward
systems that penalize those who report safety concerns at the
cost of immediate delays; 3) prioritizing resources and work
items to balance efficiency and safety; 4) examining the
unintended consequences of regulatory requirements, such as NRC
pressures for disciplinary action against employees who err, and
the tensions between proceduralization and autonomy; 5)
considering life cyle issues such as the difficulty of obtaining
replacement parts as plants age; 6) understanding the ways the
organizational pathways lead off the formal organizational chart
to the informal organization that springs up to accomplish the
work; and 7) recognizing how knowledge is distributed across
levels and functions, such as the separation between technical
specialization and broad overview when both are needed to detect
hazardous combinations that could penetrate defense-in-depth.
The cases will provide data with which we can begin to
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characterize organizational patterns and configurations as well
as managerial strategies and processes that enhance safe
performance, and develop helpful concepts and tools for
organizational learning.
Performance Improvement
Prof. Alfred Marcus discussed the processes underlying
efforts at performance improvement that have contributed to the
enhancement of performance and safety in the past decade.
Performance improvement relies heavily on learning from operating
experience, which includes problem recognition and programs of
remedial action. The "big" problems faced by nuclear utilities,
which emerge from regulatory requirements, international events
such as TMI and Chernobyl, more local incidents, financial
competitiveness, and performance comparisons, have solutions that
are hard to find and expensive to implement.
All organizations tend to respond to problems by selecting
from an existing inventory of solutions. In the nuclear power
industry, common solutions are realigning corporate and plant
relationships through structural changes to the nuclear
department, upgrading plant positions and programs, seeking
successful management models such as the Navy supervisory model
or the McKinsey Seven S's (Structure, Strategy, Systems, Shared
Values, Skills, Style, Staff), bringing in new outside
leadership, buying management training, copying new management
approaches (such as empowerment), and focusing on measurable
indicators of performance and cost.
On the one hand, these activities facilitate improvement.
They reflect the changing needs of organizations, continuous
adjustment to feedback, flexible management that admits there is
no "one best way" to manage and must weave together these
different approaches. On the other hand, these activities may
inhibit improvement by creating distractions from or resource
competition with basic tasks such as learning from experience,
preventive maintenance, outage planning, and making key operating
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decisions. Management needs to continually consider how to
assure a better fit between problems and solutions, while keeping
aligned the solutions to small and big problems.
The opportunities for intensive investigation of problem
diagnoses and change implementations at several plant sites can
provide detailed cases of organizations coping with these
critical processes.
Mental Models
Prof. John Carroll discussed how identification of plant
conditions, diagnosis of underlying problems, and design of
programs of corrective action, are based on interpretations made
by plant personnel who possess somewhat overlapping yet distinct
understandings of the technical and human systems in plants.
These understandings or "mental models" of plant operations are
distributed among occupational groups and different levels of
experience. Effective interpretation and change management
requires the marshalling of these distributed partial models.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a feature of "good"
plants will be mental models that individually and collectively
diagnose problems effectively.
Some of the assumptions and character of these mental models
is readily apparent. The industry has long relied on models that
analyze technical systems into components and focus on parts,
suggest technical fixes, use hardware redundancy as a major
safety feature, pay attention to man-machine interfaces, and
focus blame on individual human error or lack of attention to
detail. More recently, the industry has wrestled with
organizational issues that reach into the social and cultural
systems in plants, utilities, and the industry as a whole. The
models most frequently encountered include control from the top,
nuclear executives shaping their organizations in their image,
eomppliance" through strict proceduralization and division of
labor by expertise, hiring quality people and training them,
sharing problems and "best practice" solutions, problem analysis
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through "root cause" methods, and problem resolution through
corrective action programs.
Although the above images have been usefully employed to
improve industry performance, the available vocabulary of mental
models suggests some shortcomings. Missing are details about the
managerial, social and cultural systems in organizations
comparable to the details of technical systems and individual
human error. For example, at one plant a very thoughtful task
force leader shared his concern about the "philosophy" of the
NRC. He believes the NRC focus on "problem resolution" tends to
put plants in the position of waiting for difficulties to emerge,
at which time solutions are generated to address the problem,
ie., problem resolution programs begin with problems. He
compared this to putting on band-aids. He prefers a concept of
"process improvement" that he sees as more proactive and capable
of introducing more fundamental and timely changes. This is a
different mental model of change, and requires more attention to
the details of plant organization and work processes.
For the most part, "mental models" of plant operations are
implicit. They are rarely discussed or formally presented. They
emerge as the foundation of the interpretive work that occurs
around problems, incidents, or issues that create surprise,
concern, or a need to know more. In short, mental models are
revealed as they are used. As people in the plant discuss and
analyze such issues together, they are exposed to each others'
mental models, and each person's own models becomes more general,
more comprehensive, and more consistent and closely linked with
others' models.
In order to understand better these interpretive and
learning processes, we present to employees for their analysis a
small number of interesting examples from actual situations in
plants, as reported in Lifted Leads and Nuclear Network. The
employees are in different hierarchical levels, divisions, and
occupations, across a range of plants. Each person is asked to
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discuss the causes and conditions underlying the situation, what
further information they wish to have, what would happen in their
plant following such an incident, and what they would recommend
as responses. Currently, pilot testing of the materials is
underway at one nuclear power plant.
We will examine the nature and distribution of categories
and language in these "mental models" across functional areas and
hierarchical levels in plants and utilities. The volume and
variety of analysis, the attention to systemic, social, and
cultural factors, and the degree to which ideas are shared across
functional and hierarchical boundaries can be related to plant
performance.
Forms of Collaborative Research
Among the possibilities for research are opportunities for
intensive collaboration on projects initiated by plants
themselves. One mode of research, called "action research," has
employees define problems they wish to solve and create
interdisciplinary teams with outside researchers on the team.
The advantages are: the researchers have additional
observational opportunities in a cross-functional project that is
working to effect change, which should be a rich source of
insight about the organization, barriers to change, and
strategies to overcome the barriers; there are opportunities for
immediate feedback about the researchers' ideas including the
effects of including these ideas in action programs; and the
researchers are forced to be action-oriented, to bridge the gap
between abstract generalities and concrete realities, and thereby
transfer both explicit theories and technologies, and more
implicit knowledge and methods.
This is a resource-intensive mode of research; each such
engagement would be a lengthy commitment of dedicated personnel.
Further, it must be maintained in a research, not a consulting,
framework. Discussion pointed out that such work would be most
valuable if carried out in two or three places in the U.S. and
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abroad. One possibility is to collect data on all three projects
from the same two or three sites in Year 3, although other
related studies may involve short visits and remote data
collection from additional plants.
Prof. Donald Schon provided some frameworks for considering
different forms of collaborative research. He observed that the
Panel members expressed a desire to be more involved in the
research through access to stories and research observations so
that they can form their own interpretations, to theories that
help make sense of the situations, and to ideas and practices
about intervention and change. The issue, then, is how to design
a learning process as a collaborative effort of researchers and
sponsor employees involved in incident reviews.
The research model of normal social science typically
assumes that the researcher is a distant and objective observer
whose task is to create models from a generalizable body of
scientific knowledge. The scientist writes a book that a manager
finds suggestive of answers to problems; the manager hires a
consultant who forms a team to apply the knowledge. However,
even in situations with available scientific knowledge, the
implementation process is likely to distort or ignore such
knowledge. Researchers and consultants are not just distant
observers of plants; when their reports are unused, they are part
of the problem.
The process of implementing research findings in an
organization is likely to be much more reliable and productive
when: (a) the practitioners are involved in generating the data
and forming and testing ideas about it, and (b) the
implementation process is itself conceived as an continuation of
the research process in which new applications and new theories
can be generated to deal with new phenomena (including resistance
to change) that crop up during implementation. Thus,
collaborative research supports the dual goals of improving
performance and advancing science.
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In order for all this to work out, the practitioners have to
be interested in trying to make the process work -- something
they are much more likely to do if they have a hand in
constructing the ideas they are trying to implement and if they
believe that they can influence these ideas in the course of
implementation. The collaborative relationship is structured to
capture the local "hands-on" knowledge of practitioners close to
the working situation, to create commitment from those who are
formulating the application and carrying out the intervention,
and to empower people who must use the results of the research.
Further, the collaborative relationship makes the researchers
more central as observers of and contributors to the
implementation process.
Teams of practitioners can become action researchers who
invent and test new strategies of problem solving or intervention
and design organizational structures to facilitate work, which
are likely to enhance their effectiveness. Prof. Schon gave the
example of a Rand project on the Sage system which found (in a
situation with fast, iterative, and publicly-available
performance feedback, extended time to learn, and rewards for
improved performance) that when structural constraints
(procedures and roles) were removed, work teams invented their
own, more efficient social solutions to communication and
learning, and greatly improved their performance.
Action research raises fundamental issues of organizational
structure, cooperation, authority, blaming, fear, shame, and
embarassment. The very top of the firm has to be prepared to
face these issues, and support their discussion in the research
and implementation teams. For example, the failure of a large-
scale communications network turned out to be due to a latent
software bug: one misplaced punctuation mark in a program with
millions of instructions. When that error was traced back to its
root causes, many issues surfaced. Among these was the fact that
the network had become extraordinarily complex, indeed, beyond
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any one individual's understanding, because it was being
customized to meet the needs of many different users. Underlying
the network failure, then, was a dilemma involving market
responsiveness vs. network reliability. But within the
organization, this dilemma was undiscussable: People feared they
would lose their jobs if they insisted on raising the issue.
This example suggests that fear, shame, embarrassment and threat
can impede the reliable functioning of organizational learning
systems. An effective program of action research must treat such
phenomena as objects of inquiry.
It would be immoral to embark on collaborative research
designs unless the length of time commitment was sufficient and
top management is willing to listen to the results with an open
mind and sincere commitment to solve the problem. Such
commitment is facilitated by paying part of the cost of the
research, since someone has to work the issue through the
organization to authorize payment, which paves the way for
further authorizations of change.
Prospects for Further Collaboration and Panel Activity
Several Panel members expressed a desire to be more directly
involved in the Study Group research. Discussion ranged over
ways to create more involvement, including providing the Panel
with more of the unprocessed observations of the researchers for
comment and interpretations, creating a more succinct statement
of the theories and models being developed by the Study Group,
and writing case-like materials on our research observations to
be used as communication and educational materials. The issue of
confidentiality of plant identity was discussed, and seemed to be
manageable. The Study Group was exciting by this expression of
cooperation and desire to share knowledge, and will work on ways
to pursue these ideas.
There was considerable support for more intensive
collaborative modes of research, and recognition of the
considerable resource commitment they entailed. The Panel agreed
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that such activity should retain a research focus, rather than a
consulting focus. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to have
part of the costs paid by the research sites, and to have
multiple sites to maintain the clarity of research focus.
The Panel recognized that the strategic choices for the
Study Group were also questions of resource allocation and
resource acquisition. It was hoped that additional resources
could be found, and research designed such that intensive
collaborative research could be carried out along with less-
intensive data collection from other plants. Additional
resources may depend on demonstrable products from the research,
making it incumbent on the Study Group to put its ideas, its
observations, and its preliminary interpretations in a form that
can be readily communicated to the Panel and to current and
prospective sponsors. The Panel expressed great interest in and
willingness to help shape such products. Also, the Panel
suggested that "products" should be thought of broadly, including
our theoretical approaches and our observations as well as our
conclusions and any research-based recommendations or new
programs. Finally, the Panel encouraged the ideas of studying
the organization and management of the NRC (which has not been
subject to study by GAO or others).
The Study Group was asked to issue a report or proceedings
of the Panel meeting for general distribution, as rapidly as
possible. To ensure accuracy and confidentiality of particular
statements about plant incidents and performance, a preliminary
version of the report is to be sent out for comment to all Panel
participants before release as an MIT research report. The Study
Group will also develop materials communicating our approach and
observations for comment by the Panel, and work toward "case-
like" materials as a vehicle for our observations, a means for
eliciting the interpretations and viewpoints of the Panel, and a
management training tool.
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